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THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF RULE
804(a) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide twenty-nine separate
exceptions1 to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible into
evidence at trial. 2 The first twenty-four are embodied in rule 803,
and apply regardless of the availability of the declarant.3 The
remaining five - former testimony, dying declarations, statements
against interest, statements of pedigree, and "other exceptions ' 4
- are set out in rule 804(b), and apply only when the declarant is
"unavailable." 5
The standards for determining unavailability under the
Federal Rules are set out in rule 804(a).6 There are five situations
in which the witness will be considered unavailable - when the
witness has a valid privilege not to testify, refuses to testify, claims
lack of memory, is dead or unable to testify due to illness, or is
absent and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
secure his attendance.7  A witness will not be considered
unavailable, however, if the proponent of his statement has
procured his absence for the purpose of preventing him from
testifying."
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence have been in effect
since 1975, there have to date been relatively few reported decisions
1. FED. R. Evin. 803, 804(b). North Dakota has adopted rules 803 and 804 nearly verbatim
from the Federal Rules, with minor alterations in rules 803(22) and 804(b)(2), (3). (4), and (5).
N.D.R. Evtn. 803, 804. Rule 8 04(a) of the North Dakota Rules, setting out the unavailabilitv
requirements, is identicalto the corresponding federal rule. N.D.R. Evi. 804(a).
2. FED. R. EviD. 802.
3. FeD, R. Evto. 803.
4. FED, R. EVtD. 804(b).
5. FED, R. Evto. 804.
6. FED. R. EVtD. 8 04(a).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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which have extensively discussed the unavailability requirements
of rule 804(a). 9 The cases which have been decided, however,
provide invaluable assistance in assessing the scope of the
unavailability requirements. The purpose of this Note will be to
outline the general scope of the unavailability requirements of rule
804(a), with particular emphasis placed on court decisions which
have focused on specific problem areas encountered under the
rules.
It should be noted that the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution ° comes into play in
any criminal case in which an unavailable witness's prior statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact against a defendant."1 The
United States Supreme Court has noted that, although the hearsay
rules and confrontation clause generally protect similar values,
their reach is not co-extensive:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete, and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as
they existed historically at common law. Our decisions
have never established such a congruence; indeed, we
have more than once found a violation of confrontation
values even though the statements in issue were admitted
under an arguably recognized hearsay exception .... The
converse is equally true: merely because evidence is
admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule
does not lead to the automatic conclusion that
confrontation rights have been denied.12
9. It should also be noted that the drafters' comments and advisory committee notes to rule
804(a) provide little guidance in determining the scope and applicability of the unavailability
I - frl llsl. 'l'lic'si. ( ()llillltclis ;Ind( nowls. so t'iarasI Il V itl'(' ofa lal ecI;f(t. are d'"(iscussed Ibelow it] the'
t< h' olfsP 'cili " till ',vailabilily rt.(Iluh-ellicils.
If I "' lIIn all ( rinlinl Iroslo( lions. 1hc" jcus'l shal 'njio Ili' right . . . to I)e confront'd with
the % w IC S (-S ;L nnl l hliti." U.S. (CONS'r. anien(I. V I.
SI. ,' ' 4.1. WVtINsTrIN & M. Bl r(o.r. "V',NSTE:In's Ev nCm nx 804-34 ( 1979) 1herinad'fir cited a's
\W I'nS FAlN I. r 1tii,' I larhin. how,,t'r, haIs suggrst.d that ' o nl rnt;alion (Iluse mhay not applv at
;III swvlw.l Ihe' w.,ilni'ss is "i~x:i~h ' I"l ' lhi Confrontaition CIoIis(c or~h ixt h Am('ndhncni r(ea(4tls
,,,, I'1 lher Il ,i''llli ' Ihi ' dw l'.r ' lli on Io prohu(' anv va/la/ld witnes'.' s whose declarations it s'eeks
Io o,- ill a rimiti al IriAl." (alufi nia v. ;re i. 39( U.S. 149. 174 (1970) (Harlan. I.. 'oncurring)(emphasis in original). Several commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court adoptJustice
I lr l ci Ih',r v.., W (. In. 7,. ehtolr' of ('onfrontation, 77 Nltici. L. Rev. 1185 (1979):
Younger, Conlrontation and Hearsay. A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, I HOFSTRA L. REv. 32, 41-42( 1973). "]hc' Courtl'. ho)wc(.% l', h s notl asN Vy l v'nlra(ced this dihv'r\y. andI. in fiic(t..julstice( Harlan
h lt1- .Irs rpiilliait-d his c',ric'r iosition.,c l)r tut . Evans' . 400 I.S. 74. 94-96 (1970) (Harlan.
.. ,' I rri1.L).
12. (:;1il, nia '. (;,,*,. 39!)0 (I.5. 149. 155-56 (19l70.
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The general conflict between the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rules will not be discussed in detail in this note.' 3
Confrontation problems applicable to specific unavailability
requirements under the Federal Rules, however, will be addressed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNAVAILABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
It is helpful, prior to discussing in-depth the specific
unavailability requirements of the Federal Rules, to note the
historical development of the hearsay rule and the unavailability
requirements at common law. Hearsay evidence has been defined
as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made
out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the
truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.' 14 Such evidence is
inadmissible unless it falls within a recognized exception to the
general rule excluding hearsay. 15 There are three reasons generally
advanced for excluding hearsay evidence: "the statement may not
have been made under oath; the declarant may not have been
subjected to cross-examination when he made the statement; and
the jury cannot observe the declarant's demeanor at the time he
made the statement."1 6
Several of the exceptions to the hearsay rule which developed
at common law required as a prerequisite that the declarant be
unavailable as a witness at trial.i" The requirement of
unavailability has been interpreted to be a rule of preference:
When unavailability of the declarant is made a
condition precedent to admitting his hearsay statement, a
rule of preference is in fact being stated. His personal
presence in court, under oath and subject to cross-
examination, would be preferred. If, however, that
13. For a more complete discussion of the conflict between the admission of hearsay evidence
and the confrontation clause, see Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearvay Rule, and the Forletfu/
Witness, 56 TEx. L. REv. 151 (1978); laffe, The Constitution and Proof By Dead or tinconfrontahle
Declarants, 33 ARK. L. REV. 227, 236-260 (1979); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MIcH. L.
REV. 1185 (1979); Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, I HOFSTRA L.
REV. 32 (1973).
14. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §. 246. at 584 (2d ed. F. Cleary 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMCK].
15. Id. S.3 25, at 751.
16. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149. 154 (1970).
17. MCCORMICK. supra note 14. § 253. at 608.
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cannot be had, then his hearsay statement falling within
the particular hearsay exception, although admittedly
inferior, is still to be preferred over doing entirely without
evidence from that source. Thus the group of hearsay
exceptions where unavailability is required are in a sense
second class in comparison with the far larger number of
exceptions where availability or unavailability is simply
not a factor.' 8
The generally recognized forms of unavailability at common law
were death, absence, physical disability, mental incapacity, failure
of memory, exercise of privilege, refusal to testify, and supervening
disqualification. 19 Historically, the requirements for unavailability
for certain hearsay exceptions were developed in connection with
each particular exception to the hearsay rule.2 0 As a result, the
requisites of unavailability varied depending upon the particular
exception invoked. 21
Only recently has there been a move toward adopting a
uniform standard of unavailability for all hearsay exceptions which
require unavailability. 22 The Federal Rules recognize privilege,
refusal to testify, lack of memory, death or infirmity, and absence
as instances in which the declarant is "unavailable. ' 23 These
standards apply uniformly to all of the exceptions which require
unavailability as a prerequisite. 24
Although the federal rule speaks of the unavailability of the
declarant, commentators and courts have pointed out that the
critical factor is the unavailability of the declarant's testimony. 25
Obviously, if the declarant, in court, exercises a privilege or refuses
to testify, he is present at trial; nevertheless, the unavailability of
his testimony satisfies the requirement.
Under the Federal Rules, the burden of establishing the
witness's unavailability is on the party seeking to introduce the
prior statements. 26 Various federal courts have also stated that the
18. Id.
19. Id. at 609-12.
20. Id. at 608.
21. For example, some jurisdictions required the declarant to be dead to satisfy the
unavailability requirement when introducing declarations against interest. Id. § 280, at 678.
Similarly, only death satisfied the unavailability requirement when dying declarations were offered
as evidence. Id. S 282, at 681.
22. Id. § 253, at 608; WEINSTEIN, sup ra note 11, at 804-33.
23. FED. R. Evtn. 804(a).
24. Id.
25. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 253, at 608; WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-33: Mason v.
United States, 408 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188. 191 (5th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1101 (1977); United Statesv. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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trial court's determination of unavailability will only be reversed if
there has been abuse of discretion.2 7
The preceding material provides a context within which the
unavailability requirements of the Federal Rules may be discussed.
The following is a rule-by-rule discussion of the various forms of
unavailability which are recognized in the Federal Rules.
III. RULE 804(a) (1)-PRIVILEGE
Rule 80 4 (a) (1) provides that a declarant will be unavailable
when he "is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his
statement." ' 28  The rule requires that the declarant assert a
recognized privilege and that the court rule on this assertion. The
rule is most commonly invoked by claims of spousal immunity or
the privilege against self-incrimination. 29
A. REQUIREMENT OF ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND RULING
BY THE COURT
Rule 804(a) (1) provides that a witness will be unavailable if
'exempted by ruling of the court.' '30 This implies that the
declarant must first assert the privilege in court and that the court
must rule that the declarant or his testimony is in fact privileged.
Recent federal court decisions have expressly recognized these
requirements.
In United States v. Pelton, 3 1 a defendant attempted to introduce
into evidence the prior grand jury testimony of a witness.3 2
Defendant's counsel contended that the witness was unavailable
under rule 804(a) (1) because the witness's attorney had indicated
that he would advise his client to invoke her privilege under the
fifth amendment and refuse to testify.3 3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, noting that the burden of producing
an unavailable declarant is upon the proponent of the evidence,3 4
27. See, e.g., United States v. Amava, 533 F.2d 188. 191 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1101 (1977); United Statesv. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1290 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(1). This rule is in accord with previous practice in the federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir.). cert denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970):
United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1969).
29. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11. at 804-35.
30. FED. R. EvIn. 804(a)(1).
31. 578 F.2d 701 t8th Cir.). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964(1978).
32. United States v,. Pelton. 578 F.2d 701. 709 (8th Cir.). cert. denied. 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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held that the defendant had failed to establish that the witness
would in fact invoke her fifth amendment privilege and thus be
unavailable to testify. 35 The court concluded that, without a first-
hand, in-court assertion of privilege, the trial court had only a
speculative basis for determining whether the witness was
available. 36 The decision in Pelton indicates that rule 804(a) (1)
requires an in-court assertion of the privilege by the declarant and
a ruling by the court.
Other federal courts have, in dicta, discussed the requirement
of an in-court assertion of the privilege and a ruling by the court. In
United States v. Oropeza, 37 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted that the declarant had indicated that he would
assert his privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify,
although he never expressly asserted the privilege. 38 The court
stated that, "[blecause the rule requires a finding of unavailability,
an express claim of privilege and a ruling thereon should be
made. "9 Similarly, in United States v. Mangan,40 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that rule 804(a) (1)
''requires a ruling from the court that the desired testimony is
privileged.' '41
35. Id. at 709-10.
36. Id. The court stated:
Our review of the record convinces us that Rich utterly failed to carrv this burden.
Counsel for Rich made no effort to produce Waggoner, whom he had subpoenaed.
and to demonstrate first-hand and in the court's presence that she did intend to refuse
to testify in reliance on her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Rather, he chose to raise the issue of her privilege in an extentated and circuitous
manner which gave the court nothing more than a speculative basis for determining
whether she was available. Rich's proof that Waggoner was unavailable under Rule
804(a)(1) was that Waggoner's attornev had said that he was going to advise
Waggoner not to testify. There was no indication that Waggoner had in fact been so
advised or that, if she had been. she had decided to exercise her,privilege. We consider
Rich's suggestion, that Waggoner might in the future be advised of and then choose to
exercise her fifth amendment privilege, to be a whollh inadequate showing of
unavailability under Rule 804(a)(1). The trial cout did not err in refttsing. on this
speculative hasis, to allow Rich to introduce into evidence the transcript of
Waggoner's testimony before the grand jury.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
38. United States v. Oropeza. 564 F.2d 316, 325 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978).
39. Id. The issue of unavailability apparently had not been raised by the parties in this case. The
court in a footnote raises the issue, noting that there was some question as to the declarant's
unavailability, but stated that it would assume the declarant's unavailability for the purpose of
reaching the merits in the case. Id.
40. 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
41. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32. 45 n.14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).'
The court discussed rule 804(a)(1) only in explaining why it was not invoking one of the rule 804(b)
exceptions. The court noted that, because there had been no ruling bv a court that the declarant's
testimony was privileged, he was not unavailable, and his prior statements were not admissible as-
statements against interest under rule 804(b)(3). Id.
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In one federal case, however, the court apparently reached the
conclusion that it may be proper to find a declarant unavailable
even though he has not expressly asserted a privilege. In Lowery v.
Maryland,42 petitioner sought to introduce the sworn affidavit of a
witness who had testified against him at his earlier murder trial. In
the affidavit, the witness stated that he had testified falsely at the
earlier trial due to police pressure.4 3 The witness failed to appear at
a scheduled hearing, and the State objected to introduction of his
affidavit.44 The court noted that the witness did have a valid fifth
amendment privilege, although he had not appeared in court to
assert his privilege.4 5 The court apparently held that the mere fact
that he had a valid privilege was sufficient to support a
determination that he was unavailable under rule 804(a) (1).46
It appears that the better rule, as set out in Pelton, is to require
an express assertion of the privilege and a ruling by the court before
finding a declarant unavailable under rule 804(a) (1). Allowing a
trial court to determine unavailability without an express assertion
of privilege by the declarant renders its decision speculative at best.
Requiring an in-court assertion of the privilege provides positive
proof that the declarant's testimony is in fact unavailable. Because
the declarant's presence at trial and in-court testimony is preferred
over his out-of-court prior statements, 47 the courts should require a
strong showing that the declarant is actually unavailable before
admitting his earlier statements. A speculative determination that
the declarant would assert his privilege if called to testify does not
provide a sufficiently strong showing of unavailability to allow into
evidence his earlier statements.
The import of the federal court decisions is that the privilege
must be expressly asserted in court, and the court must rule on the
assertion. The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 804 lends
further support to this conclusion: "A ruling by the judge is
required, which clearly implies that an actual claim of privilege
must be made. "48 If the declarant, after asserting the privilege, is
found to have a valid privilege, he is unavailable under rule 804(a)
(1). Failure to comply with these requirements renders the
42. 401 F. Supp. 604 (). Md.). ff'rlt. 532 F.2uI 750 (4Ili (Cir. 1975). cot. drnird. -21) 1'.S. 911
(1976).
43. Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Md.), aff'd 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
44. Id. it 605-06.
45. Id. 606.
46. Id
47. NM C.ORMICK. supra nolt 14. § 253, ()al .
48. FED. R. EvIo. 804 (Advisory Committee's Note), quoted in WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-
16. ,SPP(1ru W FINSTFIN. sup/ra o()tl I 1. ;i 804-35.
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declarant available under rule 804(a) (1), although he may still be
found unavailable under a different rule. 49
B. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It has been generally recognized that a declarant who asserts a
valid fifth amendment claim will be considered unavailable under
rule 804(a) (1).5 0 Various federal courts, however, have recently
more fully outlined the scope of the rule.
In United States v. Rogers, 51 the court indicated that one who has
pleaded guilty on a charge relating to the incident which is in
question will not be considered unavailable under rule 804(a) (1).52
Although the court did not elaborate, it appears that this result is
proper in light of the requirement that the assertion of privilege be
valid. Because a guilty plea has been held to involve a simultaneous
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, 53 it is clear that a
declarant who has pleaded guilty to offenses arising out of the
incident in question no longer has a valid privilege, and is not,
therefore, unavailable under rule 804(a) (1). The court in Rogers
noted, however, that if the declarant could be charged with another
offense arising out of the same incident he may still have a valid
fifth amendment privilege.5 4 Taking into account the wide variety
of offenses which might arise out of a given criminal transaction,
particularly under federal law, it appears that in many cases the
declarant will still have a valid privilege.
In United States v. Lang,55  a defendant challenged the
admissibility of prior statements of one of his accomplices. 56 The
49. For example, if' the witness refuses to testify after a ruling by the court that the claimed
privilege is invalid, he may be declared unavailable under rule 804(a)(2). See infra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787. 789 (6th Cir. 1979): Witham v. Mabry. 596
F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977).
In one recent federal case, the defendant made the novel argument that a co-defendant who had
asserted a valid fifth amendment privilege was not unavailable under rule 8 0 4(a)(1) because, "as a
defendantin a criminal trial, he [couldl invoke his fifth amendment privilege without any exemption
13y ruling of the court." United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 792 (1st Cir. 1979). cert. denied
U.S. __ , 100 S. Ct. 2945 (1980). Although noting that a ruling by the court is required.
the court concluded that unavailability tinder the federal rule "includes the situation where a witness
invokes his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
51. 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
52. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 498 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918
(1977).
53. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
466(1969).
54. 549 F.2d at 498 n.8. In Rogers, the declarant had pleaded guilty to robbery, but the court
noted that he could also have been charged with illegal purchase of a firearm. Id. The court did not
rule on whether this fact affected the declarant's privilege, however, because it was merely discussing
in a footnote issues which were not raised by the parties. Id.
55. 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978).
56. United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1978).
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accomplice had appeared in court and invoked a valid fifth
amendement privilege.5 7 The defendant contested the court's
finding of unavailability, claiming that the prosecution had
"procured" the declarant's unavailability by wrongfully refusing
to grant the declarant immunity. 58  The court rejected the
defendant's contention, noting that the Executive Branch's power
to grant immunity is discretionary and no obligation exists on the
part of the United States Attorney to seek such immunity. 59
The court in Lang did note, however, that under a different
fact situation such an argument might prevail. Citing an earlier
federal decision 60 in which the witness initially had indicated her
willingness to testify for the defendant but had been induced into
invoking her fifth amendment privilege by continual, harrassing
threats of prosecution made by an Assistant United States
Attorney, the court recognized that in exceptional situations it may
be proper for the trial court to require the prosecution to grant
immunity to the witness. 6' The court in Lang went on to conclude,
however, that no such prosecutorial misconduct existed in the
instant case, and therefore the declarant's unavailability had not
been procured by the prosecution. 62 The court apparently left open
the question whether a failure to provide immunity in a case of
blatant prosecutorial misconduct would constitute "procuring" the
absence of the witness, thereby precluding a finding -of
unavailability and rendering the witness's earlier statements
inadmissible. 63
One court has noted that a declarant's unavailability under
rule 804(a) (1) may be temporary. In United States v. Henry,64 the
court noted that, although the witnesses in question had already
asserted their fifth amendment rights and had been declared
unavailable by the trial court, their status as unavailable witnesses
was "necessarily 'for the time being'; it is a potentially evanescent
status. "65 Indicating that the witnesses could be subpoenaed again
and thereafter might waive their fifth amendment rights or be
granted immunity, 66 the court stated that "the ruling on
57. Id.
58. Id. The last sentence of rule 804(a) provides that a witness is not unavailable if his exemption
is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from testifying. FEo. R. EviD. 804(a).
59. 589 F.2d at 95-96.
60. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
61. 589 F.2d at 96.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 448 F. Supp. 819 (D.N..J. 1978).
65. United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978).
66. Id.
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'unavailability' was based on the facts as they stood then, and that
the ruling might be different in the future if the facts changed. "67
The court's decision implies that trial courts must be aware of
changing circumstances which might render a previously
unavailable witness available.
The decisions which have discussed assertion of a self-
incrimination privilege under rule 804(a) (1) have focused on the
validity of the privilege and on wrong-doing by the proponent of
the evidence to procure assertion of the privilege. In Rogers, the
court stressed that a declarant who had waived his privilege by
pleading guilty was no longer unavailable under rule 804(a) (1); in
Lang, the court hinted that serious prosecutorial misconduct which
procures the declarant's assertion of privilege might require court-
ordered immunity. In discussing spousal immunity, the other
frequently invoked privilege under rule 804(a) (1), similar
questions of validity of the claim and procurement of assertion of
the privilege will arise.
C. SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
It has been generally recognized that a declarant's valid
assertion of spousal immunity will render him unavailable under
rule 804(a) (1).68 Difficulties may arise, however, when the validity
of the claim is called into question. In United States v. Mathis, 69 the
defendant and the declarant had previously been divorced. 70 When
the wife began cooperating with the authorities relating to her
former husband's criminal activities, she was coerced into
remarrying him by bribes, promises of custody of their child, and,
finally, threats upon the lives of her child and herself. 71 At trial the
wife exercised her right not to testify against her husband, and the
trial court admitted her prior statements into evidence. 72 In
concluding that the trial court had erred in admitting these
statements, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mathis, 559
F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
It should be noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court has recently limited the
scope of spousal immunity in federal criminal trials. In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980), the Court held that a defendant in a federal criminal trial could not prevent his spouse from
testifying against him. Id. at 53. The witness spouse, however, may still refuse to testify against the
defendant spouse. Id. The Court also left intact the privilege for marital communications, which
protects confidential communications between spouses. Id. at 51.
69. 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 296-97.
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held that the witness was available. 73 Citing the well-established
rule that the spousal privilege is invalid if the trial judge determines
that the marriage was fraudulent, the court held that in the instant
case the privilege was invalid, the witness was available, and
therefore the witness should have been ordered to testify. 74
IV. RULE 804(a) (2) - REFUSAL
Rule 804(a) (2) provides that a declarant will be considered
unavailable if he "persists in refusing to testify concerning the
subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do
so. ,,75 Initially, the rule requires a court order directing the witness
to testify. This requirement is clearly met when the witness is cited
for contempt by the court for refusing to testify. 7 6
In United States v. Oliver, 77 however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that mere judicial
pressure to testify, without an express order of the court to do so,
may not satisfy the requirement. 78 In Oliver, the witness was
advised by the trial court that he had no fifth amendment privilege
not to testify, although he was never expressly ordered to testify. 79
The Court of Appeals, although noting that the trial court's denial
of the witness's privilege claim constituted judicial pressure to
testify, nevertheless refused to find the witness unavailable,
concluding that a. specific court order to testify "is an essential
requisite to the invocation of Rule 804(a) (2)."o
One federal court, however, has apparently held that a court
order is not required before a witness may be declared unavailable
under rule 804(a) (2). In Lowery v. Maryland, 81 the court held that a
declarant was unavailable, apparently under rule 804(a)(2), al-
73.Id. at 298.
74. Id. The court stated that a refusal to testify after the court has declared the privilege invalid
may render the witness unavailable under rule 864(a)(2), but noted that in this case the wife had
indicated she would testify if compelled to do so. Id., see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
75. FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(2).
76. United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1272-73 (5th Cir. 1977): United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). In both of these cases
the declarants had been granted immunity, and were cited for contempt when they persisted in
refusing to testify. 559 F.2d at 1272-73: 547 F.2d at 1354. This result is in accord with previous
practice in the federal courts. See Mason v. United States. 408 F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 1969). cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
77. 626 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1980).
78. United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254. 261 (2d Cir. 1980).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md.). aff'd, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919
(1976).
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though he had not appeared in court to refuse to testify and the
court had not ordered him to testify:
Even if [declarant] is compelled to testify, he would still
be considered unavailable as a witness if he has refused to
do so, Fed.R.Evid. 804(a) (2), and [declarant's] attorney
has indicated that [declarant] would refuse to testify even
if compelled to do so. By any applicable theory,
[declarant] is unavailable as a witness. 82
In order to reach this result, the court in Lowery apparently
disregarded the unambiguous language of rule 804(a) (2), which
requires that the declarant persist in refusing to testify "despite an
order of the court to do so. " 3 In Lowery, the declarant had not even
appeared in the courtroom; his attorney had merely indicated that,
if compelled to do so, the declarant would refuse to testify.8 4 Under
these circumstances, a determination by the court that the
declarant would indeed refuse to testify was speculative at best. 85
Furthermore, the end result in such cases would be that the witness,
although present in the jurisdiction, would be allowed to avoid
testifying without suffering any penalty whatsoever. If he fails to
appear and his attorney advises the court that he will refuse to
testify, the witness is declared unavailable without being subjected
to a contempt charge. It is not difficult to imagine that many
witnesses, given the opportunity to abstain from testifying with no
sanctions imposed, would refuse to testify. The debilitating effect
on the judicial process which would result is obvious.
Clearly the better rule is to require the declarant to appear and
make his refusal to testify before the court. In this way it may be
impressed upon the witness that he may face contempt charges if he
continues to refuse to testify. If the witness continues his refusal
even after being charged with contempt, the court's last resort is to
declare the witness unavailable and to admit his earlier statements,
provided they are admissible under one of the exceptions to the
82. Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 606 (D. Md.), aff'd, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976). It should be noted that the court recognized that the declarant may
have had a valid claim of privilege, and apparently would have found him unavailable under rule8 0 4(aXl) also, although the defendant had not appeared in court to assert his privilege and the trial
court had not ruled on the validity ofthe privilege. Id.; see supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
83. FFD. R. EvIa. 804(a)(2).
84. 401 F.Supp. at 606.
85. Cf United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978)
(declarant's attorney's indication that his client would exercise fifth amendment privilege if called to
testify insufficient to establish that declarant was unavailable under rule 804(a)(1)). Pelton is discussed
supra at notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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hearsay rule set out in rule 804(b). The court is thereby giving full
effect to the law's preference for live testimony, and accepting
hearsay statements only if no other evidence on the subject matter
is available. Finally, the language of the rule clearly contemplates a
court order compelling the declarant to testify as a prerequisite to a
finding of unavailability.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
United States v. Mathis,8 6 has indicated that a witness who
erroneously asserts a privilege and refuses to testify may be
declared unavailable under rule 804(a) (2).11 It appears that, in
certain circumstances, such a result is proper. If the declarant
explicitly refuses to testify, even after a court ruling that his claimed
privilege is invalid and a court order requiring that he testify, a
finding of unavailability under rule 804(a) (2) would be proper:
Refusal to testify despite a court order to do so is precisely the
situation comprehended in rule 804(a) (2); the fact that the
declarant's refusal to testify is based upon an erroneous assertion of
privilege should not render the rule inapplicable.
In United States v. Garner, 88 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit was faced with the difficult problem of the
witness who selectively refuses to testify, about certain matters. The
declarant refused to testify, even after a grant of immunity and
threat of a contempt citation.8 9 He subsequently indicated that he
might answer some questions of the defense counsel. 90 At trial, he
recanted his earlier grand jury testimony and declined to answer or
gave evasive answers to questions put by defense counsel. 91 The
trial court found that his "disclaimers of knowledge" were "the
equivalent of a refusal to testify," ' 92 and found him unavailable,
apparently under rule 804(a) (2). 93 The court therefore admitted
into evidence the declarant's prior grand jury testimony. 94
The court's somewhat strained determination of unavailability
apparently was an attempt to avoid conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in California v. Green.95 Clearly the proper
86. 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
87. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977). In Mathis, however, the witness
did not persist in her refusal to testify, but explicitly stated that she would testify if ordered to do so.
Id. The court, noting that the declarant's privilege was found to be invalid, concluded that she was
not unavailable under rule 804(a)(2) because she had not expressly refused to testify. Id.
88. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).




93. Id. The court did not explicitly state which subdivision of rule 804(a) it was interpreting, but
it appears that the basis of its finding was the declarant's refusal to testify.
94. Id. at 1146.
95. 399 U.S. 149(1970).
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avenue for admission of the declarant's grand jury testimony would
have been as a prior inconsistent statement under rule 801(d) (1)
(A). 96 Green, however, requires that such prior statements are
admissible at trial only if full and complete cross-examination of the
witness is afforded at trial. 97 Absent the opportunity for full and
complete cross-examination at trial, admission of prior inconsistent
statements violates the confrontation clause. 98 Apparently in order
to avoid the confrontation clause issue, the court in Garner went to
great lengths to find the witness unavailable, and then admitted the
prior testimony under the less-stringent reliability requirements of
rule 804. 99 Such a result is in direct contravention of the policy
bases supporting the confrontation clause and the Federal Rules.
As noted by one commentator, "[cjourts should not escape having
to analyze the factors crucial to the application of the confrontation
clause by manipulating the concept of unavailability." 100
V. RULE 804(a) (3) - LACK OF MEMORY
Rule 804(a) (3) provides that a declarant will be unavailable if
he "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
,statement. "101 The rule is clearly applicable when a witness testifies
that he told the truth at the time of his earlier statement but does
not now have any personal recollection of the events in question. 102
The rule has also been applied to admit a declarant's prior
statements to refresh his memory after he claimed he could not
recall the events in question. 103
Although the rule provides that the witness is unavailable if he
testifies to a lack of memory, the House of Representatives'
Committee Report on the rule clearly indicates that the court may
choose to disbelieve the declarant's claimed lack of memory:
"rTlhe Committee intends no change in existing Federal Law
under which the court may choose to disbelieve the declarant's
96. Rule 801(d)(l)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is a prior statement of a
declarant who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to penalty of periury.
FF. R. Evin. 801(d)(l)(A). In Garner, the grandjury testimony was a prior inconsistent statement
given under oath, and the declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. 574 F.2d
at 1143-44. Although the declarant's cross-examination was not full and complete, it does not appear
that this is a requirement under rule 801(d)(1)(A).
97. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149. 158 (1970).
98. Id.
99. 574 F.2d at 1144-46.
100. WEINSTF.IN, supra note 11. at 804-37.
101. FF0. R. EvIn. 804(a)(3).
102. See McDonnell v. United States. 472 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, 412 U.S.
942 (1973) (decided prior to effective date of the Federal Rules but citing then-proposed rule
804(a)(3)).
103. United States v. Davis. 551 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.). crt. denied. 431 U.S. 923 (1977).
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testimony as to his lack of memory." 104 In discussing this issue, the
Committee Report cites an earlier federal decision, United States v.
Insana. 105 In Insana, the trial court had allowed admission of the
defendant's prior testimony when he became evasive and claimed
he could not recall the events in question. 0 6  Although
unavailability was not at issue in this case, the court noted that a
trial court has discretion to choose to disbelieve a declarant's
asserted lack of memory:
Where, as here, a recalcitrant witness who has testified to
one or more relevant facts indicates by his conduct that
the reason for his failure to continue to so testify is not a
lack of memory but a desire "not to hurt anyone," then
the court has discretionary latitude in the search for truth
. . . To be sure there may be circumstances where the
witness in good faith asserts that he cannot remember the
relevant events . . . .However, this does not mean that
the trial judge's hands should be tied where a witness does
not deny making the statements nor the truth thereof but
merely falsifies -lAck of memory. 07
The import of the Committee Report and Insana is that courts
are not required to find a witness unavailable upon his mere
assertion of lack of memory, but are allowed to determine whether,
in light of the surrounding circumstances and other testimony, the
declarant's assertion is truthful. Thus, if the court determines that
the declarant's claimed lack of memory is not genuine, it may
declare him available and refuse to admit his prior statements
under rule 804. 108
In United States v. Amaya, 109 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a somewhat different
challenge to the declarant's claimed loss of memory. The trial court
had declared the witness unavailable under rule 804(a) (3), based
on his loss of memory regarding his prior testimony."0 The
defendant challenged this conclusion on the ground that it had not
104. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-4, citing HOuiSF COMM. ON TIIE..JIODICIARY, FFi). R. Evi..
H.R. Doc. No. 650, 93d Cong., I st Sess. 15 (1973).
105. 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
106. United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1167-68(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
107. Id. at 1170.
108. Such statements may nevertheless be admissible as prior inconsistent statements under rule
801(d)(1)(A) if the requirements of that rule are met.
109. 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977).
110. United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1101
(1977).
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been established by expert testimony that the declarant's lack of
memory was permanent. 11
Initially it should be noted that the express language of rule
804(a) (3) does not require a showing of permanence of the loss of
memory. The court in Amaya, although citing rule 804(a) (3),
apparently based its holding upon rule 804(a) (4), which generally
provides that a witness is unavailable if unable to be present or to
testify because of physical or mental illness. 112 The court discussed
the declarant's loss of memory as an illness, and therefore was
confronted with the issue of the duration of the disability:
Defendant alleges that a continuance should have been
given to allow expert testimony bearing on the
permanence of the loss of memory before establishing
unavailability for trial. Although the duration of an illness
is a proper element of unavailability, the establishment of
permanence as to the particular illness is not an absolute
requirement. The duration of the illness need only be in
probability long enough so that, with proper regard to the
importance of the testimony, the trial cannot be
postponed. 1
3
The court in Amaya, however, never should have reached the
issue of the permanence of the declarant's lack of memory.
Although the declarant's lack of memory had been precipitated by
an automobile accident, 1 4 it does not appear that this is the type of
"physical or mental illness" contemplated by rule 804(a) (4). Rule
804(a) (4) requires a finding of unavailability only if the declarant is
unable to attend or testify at the trial." 5 In any case of lack of
memory the declarant will be able to attend the trial and testify,
although he may not be able to fully describe the incidents in
question. Rule 804(a) (4) seemingly is applicable only to those
situations in which the witness is physically unable to attend the
trial, or, by reason of physical or mental illness, is unable to
effectively communicate his answers to counsel's questions.
Support is lent to this conclusion by the fact that the rules
specifically provide for unavailability due to lack of memory. The
fact that a separate provision for lack of memory was provided
Ill. Id. at 191.
112. FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(4).
113. 533 F.2d at 191. Although the court apparently applied the wrong 'rule. it eventually
reached the proper result. The court noted that there was no guarantee that the witness's memory
would ever return, and therefore declared him unavailable. Id.
114. Id. at 190.
115. FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(4).
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indicates that this is a different type of "illness" than contemplated
in rule 804(a) (4). Additionally, it is apparent that trial courts will
become involved in extremely complex medical issues if they are
required in each case to make a determination of the duration and
permanency of a declarant's claimed loss of memory. Rather than
requiring courts to make necessarily speculative determinations
regarding the projected duration of the declarant's loss of memory,
it is preferable to find that any declarant who has suffered a loss of
memory concerning the subject matter of his statement is
unavailable.
VI. RULE 804(a) (4) - DEATH OR INFIRMITY
Rule 804(a) (4) provides that.a witness is unavailable if he "is
unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. "116 In virtually
all circumstances a witness who dies prior to trial will be considered
unavailable under the rule. 117 A more difficult problem is
encountered, however, when the declarant is physically or mentally
infirm.
Initially, the court must determine if the declarant's disability
is a "physical or mental illness or infirmity" as contemplated
within the rule. As noted in the previous discussion of United States
v. Amaya, 1 one federal court has apparently determined that a loss
of memory caused by an injury is an "illness" under the rule. 119 It
appears that the better interpretation, however, is that loss of
memory is covered by rule 804(a) (3), and should not be considered
an "illness" under rule 804(a) (4).120
Further difficulties are encountered when the duration or
permanency of the declarant's illness is called into question. Rule
804(a) (4) speaks of "then existing" illness; it does not address the
issue of duration. 121 In a criminal case, there is strong support for
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 61 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v.
Driscoll, 445 F. Supp. 864, 866 (D.N.J. 1978); Depew v. Hanover Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 358, 359
(E.D. Tenn. 1977); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 108, 110 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 551
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 704, 708 n.9
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
The only conceivable situation in which a deceased declarant might be considered "available"
under the rules is when the declarant was deposed prior to death. Because unavailability tinder thc
rules is based upon the unavailability of the declarant's testimony. a deceased declarant whose
deposition is available could arguably be held "available" under the Federal Rules.
118. 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977): seesupra notes 109-15 and
accompanying text.
119. United States v. Amava. 533 F.2d 188. 191 (5th Cir, 1976). cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1101
(1977).
120. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
121. FD. R. EvID. 804(a)(4).
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the conclusion that a reasonable delay to permit the witness to
attend is required by the confrontation clause. 122 The scope of this
requirement, however, is at present unclear.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
discussed this issue in Peterson v. United States. 123 In Peterson, the
defendant raised a confrontation clause claim when the trial court
admitted the prior testimony of a witness who was unavailable due
to a complicated pregnancy. 124 Although the witness's doctor had
testified that she would be unable to testify until over six months
later,1 25 the appellate court held that a continuance was necessary
to comply with the confrontation clause. 126 The court apparently
left open the question of precisely how lengthy a delay to allow a
witness to attend would be tolerated.
In Amaya, the Fifth Circuit retreated somewhat from its
holding in Peterson. The court, although apparently applying the
wrong rule, 127 stated that Peterson did not control when there was no
guarantee that the witness's disability would abate:
Although the duration of an illness is a proper element of
unavailability, the establishment of permanence as to the
particular illness is not an absolute requirement. The
duration of the illness need only be in probability long
enough so that, with proper regard to the importance of
the testimony, the trial cannot be postponed. 128
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
impliedly rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding in Peterson. In United
States v. Bell, 129 the witness had recently undergone surgery and
would have been unable to testify for at least two-and-a-half
122. Cf Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). McCormick has stated that "[a] mere temporary
disability appears not to conform with the standard established by Barber v. Page." MCCORMICK
supra note 14, S 253, at 610.
123. 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965).
124. Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 422-25 (5th Cir. 1965).
125. Id. at 423. The doctor, testifying on April 1, stated that the witness would not be able to
travel to the trial until at least six weeks after her due date in September.
126. Id. at 425. The court stated:
[The witness] was not dead, beyond the reach of process nor permanently
incapacitated. She was simply unavailable at the time of trial because of her
pregnancy. Considering the seriousness of the charges and if the Government desired
to use [the witness's] testimony, it should have requested a continuance to a time when
she could probably be present .... Irhe Government should have been required to
elect either to proceed without [the witness's] testimony or to request a continuance.
Id.
127. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
128. 533 F.2d at 191.
129. 500 F.2d 1287 (2dCir. 1974).
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months. 130 The trial court found that the witness was unavailable,
and admitted his prior testimony.13 ' The appellate court affirmed,
stating that it disagreed with Peterson "if indeed it meant to imply
that in every case where a witness is ill but will sometime recover,
the prosecution must suffer a continuance (in this instance, one of
several months ... ) or forego entirely the use of the evidence. "132
It appears that the Bell court's criticism of Peterson was
justified. It is clear that an inelastic rule which requires a
continuance in criminal cases whenever the witness will at some
time in the future sufficiently recover to be able to testify at trial
(even if the resulting delay extends for several months) would have
a debilitating effect on the judicial process. Judge Weinstein has
advocated a standard whereby the trial judge may declare the
witness unavailable if he is suffering from a physical condition
which renders him unable to testify within a reasonable time. 13
The demands of speedy trial rules and calendar pressure require
that the trial court be given broad discretion in granting
adjournments, continuances, and mistrials because of
unavailability of witnesses. 134
It should be stressed, however, that in cases in which the delay
would be reasonably short a continuance would be proper, and is
probably required by the confrontation clause in criminal
prosecutions. 135 One federal court recently opened the door for an
interpretation that any time the witness is unable to attend the trial
he may be considered unavailable, holding that a witness who was
recovering from surgery was unavailable without inquiring into the
expected duration of his convalescence.1 36 Such a result is in direct
contravention of the rights protected by the confrontation clause. A
court should not automatically declare a witness unavailable merely
because he is at present unable to attend the trial and testify. The
court should determine the probable length of the delay caused
thereby and grant a continuance if the delay would be reasonable.
In all civil cases, and in criminal cases in which the defendant
is the proponent of the hearsay evidence, the confrontation clause
considerations discussed above are inapplicable. In such cases a
lesser standard of unavailability will suffice. 137 Judge Weinstein
130. United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1290 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 1290. The court cited then-proposed rule 804(a)(4), but apparently based its ruling
on the confrontation clause claim. Id.
132. Id. (footnote omitted).
133. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-39.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 118.
136. M.S.D. Inc. v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 85, 91 n.16 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
137. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-39 to -40.
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suggests that the determination be left in the discretion of the trial
court, which should take into account the nature and expected
duration of the illness, the nature of the case, the length of time the
case has been pending, the significance of the unavailable witness's
testimony, the availability of other evidence on point, and whether
the nature of the expected testimony is such that cross-examination
would be expected to be particularly helpful. 138
VII. RULE 804(a) (5) - ABSENCE
Rule 804(a) (5) provides that a witness will be considered
unavailable if he "is absent from the hearing and the proponent of
his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the
case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b) (2), (3), or (4), his
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. "139
Thus, a proponent seeking to introduce a declarant's prior
statements under rule 804(b) (1) or (5) must attempt to secure the
attendance of the declarant by reasonable means; 140 a proponent
seeking to introduce statements under rule 804 (b) (2), (3), or (4)
must use reasonable means to procure the declarant's
attendance or testimony.14 1
A. REQUIREMENT OF SECURING DECLARANT'S TESTIMONY IF
INVOKING RULE 804(b) (2), (3), OR (4)
If seeking to introduce prior statements under rule 804(b) (2),
(3), or (4), the proponent of the statements must establish that he
was unable to secure the declarant's testimony, in addition to
attendance, by reasonable means. 142 The rule as originally
submitted by the United States Supreme Court did not include this
requirement. 143 The Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives amended the rule to include the requirement of an
attempt to depose the declarant, indicating that "[tihe amendment
[was] designed primarily to require that an attempt be made to
depose a witness (as well as to seek his attendance) as a
138. Id.
139. FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(5).
140. Rule 804(b)(1) provides an exception for former testimony: rule 804(b)(5) is a residual,
catch-all exception.
141. Rule 804(b)(2) provides an exception for dying declarations, rule 804(b)(3) excepts
statements against interest, and rule 804(b)(4) excepts statements of personal or family history.
142. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
143.56 F.R.D. 183, 320.
precondition to the witness being deemed unavailable.' ' 44
Although the Senate Judiciary Committee opposed the
amendment, 145 it became part of the rule as finally adopted. 146
The rule, when read in light of the drafters' comments, clearly
requires that the proponent of the prior statements attempt to
depose the witness as a prerequisite to a finding of unavailability. It
logically follows that a witness who has been deposed is not
unavailable if the proponent seeks to introduce his prior statements
under rule 804(b) (2), (3), or (4). His prior statements will therefore
not be admissible.
This was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of
North Dakota in State v. Poitra, '47 in which the court construed a
North Dakota rule which is identical to federal rule 804(a) (5). 148 In
Poitra, the defendant, charged with aggravated assault, sought
unsuccessfully to introduce the testimony of a witness who had
overheard one Ortley admit that he, not the defendant, had caused
the injury in question. 149 Ortley was unable to attend trial, but had
been deposed by agreement of counsel.' 50 In his deposition Ortley
denied any participation in the affray. ' 5' The trial court refused to
admit the witness's testimony regarding Ortley's confession,' 52 and
the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.' 5 3 The court based
its .decision on rule 804(a) (5), holding that Ortley was not
unavailable under the rule because his testimony had been obtained
by deposition. 154 The court made it clear that, under rule 804(a)
144. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-4, citing HousE COMM. ON THE.JUDICIARY, FED. R. Evin.,
H.R. Doc. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
145. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-6, quoting SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, FED. R.
EvtD., S. Doc. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
Under the House amendment, before a witness is declared unavailable, a party
must try to depose a witness (declarant) with respect to dying declarations.
declarations against interest, and declarations of pedigree. None of these situations
would seem to warrant this needless, impractical and highly restrictive complication.
A good case can be made for eliminating the unavailability requirement entirely for
declarations against interest cases....
In dying declaration cases, the declarant will usually, though not necessarily, be
deceased at the time of trial. Pedigree statements which are admittedly and necessarily
based largely on word of mouth are not greatly fortified by a deposition requirement.
Depositions are expensive and time-consuming. In any event, deposition
procedures are available to those who wish to resort to them.
Id.
146. FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(5).
147. 266 N.W.2d 544 (N.D. 1978).
148. N.D.R. Evto. 804(a)(5).
149. State v. Poitra, 266 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (N.D. 1978).
150. Id. at 545.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 546.
153. Id. at 547.
154. Id.
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(5), a declarant who has been deposed is no longer unavailable, and
his prior statements may not be admitted under rule 804(b) (2), (3),
or (4). 155
B. REASONABLE MEANS OF PROCURING ATTENDANCE
Rule 804(a) (5) provides that a declarant will be considered
unavailable if he is absent and the proponent of his statement has
been unable to procure his attendance at trial "by process or other
reasonable means." 56 Several courts, in a variety of contexts, have
grappled with the problem of what constitutes "reasonable
means. "
In United States v. Jones, 15 the court concluded that a lesser
effort at obtaining the witness's presence may satisfy the
"reasonable means" requirement when the evidence to be offered
is cumulative and was uncontradicted by the defendant at his
earlier trial. ' 58 In.Jones, the trial court admitted the prior testimony
of a DEA agent who was out of the country on special assignment at
the time of the second trial. 159 The court affirmed, stressing that it
would have been "unreasonable and overburdensome" to require
the prosecution to bring the agent in from out of the country. 160
The import of this decision is that determination of what constitutes
"reasonable means" requires a case-by-case examination of the
attendant circumstances.
A similar conclusion was reached in a dissenting opinion in
United States v. Brown. 161 The prosecution had introduced the
testimony of an Internal Revenue Service agent who had
interviewed approximately 160 taxpayers whose fraudulent tax
returns had been prepared by the defendant. 162 The majority held,
without reaching the unavailability issue, that introduction of the
evidence was reversible error. 163  The dissent raised the
unavailability issue, noting that the taxpayers' statements would be
admissible as statements against interest 164 if the taxpayers were
unavailable.165 The dissent concluded that, in a practical sense, the
155. Id.
156. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
157. 404 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976).
158. United States v. Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 540-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 321 (3d
Cir. 1976).
159. Id. at 540.
160. Id. at 541.
161. 548 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1977).
162. United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977).
163.d. at 1206.
164. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
165. 548 F.2d at 1212 (Gec.J., dissenting).
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sheer number of taxpayers made them unavailable under rule
804(a) (5). 166 This seems to be an inaccurate reading of the rule,
however. The rule requires that the proponent of the evidence use
reasonable means to produce each individual witness. To imply
that the rule allows the court to declare a large group of witnesses
unavailable, merely because the size of the group would make
calling each individual witness impractical, is arguably an
improper application of the rule. The rule's purpose apparently is
to ensure that a proponent of hearsay evidence uses reasonable
means to procure the attendance of individual witnesses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
concluded that the requirement that the proponent use reasonable
means to secure the attendance of the witness implies a duty to
prevent the witness from becoming absent in the first place. In
United States v. Mann, 167 the declarant,, a seventeen-year-old
Australian woman, had been arrested with the defendant on
charges of smuggling drugs. 168 After taking the declarant's
deposition, the government, having dismissed the charges against
her, returned her passport and airline tickets, and allowed her to
return to Australia.1 69 The prosecution at the time of trial
attempted to subpoena the declarant in Australia through the State
Department, although it appears clear that this was merely an
effort to establish her unavailability, thereby allowing her
deposition to be introduced at trial. 170
The court stated that rule 804(a) (5) requires a "relatively high
good faith standard" which "cannot be satisfied by perfunctory
efforts'':
Here the witness is vital to the government's case. The
government did not make as vigorous an attempt to
secure the presence of the witness as it would have made if
it did not have the prior recorded testimony. The
language of Rule 804(a)(5) suggests that "other rea-
sonable means" besides subpoenas must be tried before a
witness can be found unavailable. This relatively high
good faith standard cannot be satisfied by perfunctory
efforts, if the rule is not to sanction the government's
procuring depositions of witnesses, especially shaky
166. Id.
167. 590 F.2d 361 (lst Cir. 1978).




NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
witnesses, but then discourage attempts to bring the
witness to trial so long as the government is satisfied with
what is in the transcript. 17 1
The court further stated that the prosecution had a duty to prevent
the witness from becoming unavailable:
[T]he government's burden included more than that it
attempt to get the witness to return from Australia. Here
the problem arose only because the government abused
Rule 15(a) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]
by using it to enable the key witness to leave Puerto Rico.
This misuse directly made possible the witness' later
absence on which the government seeks to rely to
establish her unavailability within the meaning of Rule
804(a). Implicit, however, in the duty to use reasonable means to
procure the presence of an absent witness is the duty to use
reasonable means to prevent a present witness from becoming
absent. As we have already said, in this case the
government has such means at its disposal but did not
choose to use them. The defendant should not suffer the
injury from the government's choice. On this
independent basis we would find that the government
failed to demonstrate that the witness was unavailable.
Therefore, it was error to admit the deposition. 17 2
Thus, it appears that the proponent of the hearsay evidence must
use reasonable means to prevent the witness from becoming absent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has recently applied a very minimal standard for
the "reasonable means" requirement. In United States v. Bowman, 173
a prosecution witness moved out of state between the defendant's
first and second trials. 174 The prosecution did not learn of her move
until shortly before the second trial. 175 At the beginning of the
second trial, the prosecutor notified the court "that he had . . .
learned about [the witness's] move, and that she would not return
for several days." ' 176 Although there was no indication that the
prosecution had made any attempt to secure the witness's
171. Id. at 367 (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
173. 609 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1979).





attendance at trial after learning of the move,177 the Court of
Appeals held that she was unavailable. 17 8 The court's holding
apparently indicates that it will accept a very minimal showing by
the proponent of the evidence that he has used reasonable means to
procure the attendance of the witness. The mere fact that the
witness would not return for several days, however, does not
appear to be the type of "absence" contemplated under rule 804(a)
(5).179
At least two state courts, contruing rules modeled after rule
804(a) (5), have dealt with the issue of what constitutes "reasonable
means" when attempting to secure the attendance of a witness
from another state.t' 0 In State v. Waits, 181 the prosecution attempted
to subpoena a witness in Texas with a New Mexico subpoena, 182
although the declarant was not thereby compelled to appear
because the New Mexico subpoena was invalid in Texas. 18 3 The
court held that this was not a sufficiently reasonable attempt to
procure the attendance of the witness, in light of the fact that both
Texas and New Mexico had enacted the Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from without a State in Criminal
Proceedings. 184  The court held that, in order to satisfy the
"reasonable means" requirement of rule 804(a) (5), the state must
attempt to utilize the procedures of the Uniform Act. 185
The Supreme Court of North Dakota recently reached a
similar conclusion in State v. Larson, 186 although its decision was
premised on a confrontation challenge rather than on rule 804(a)
177. Id. It appears that the prosecution attempted to subpoena the witness at her last known in-
state address before learning of her move. Id.
There may be a lesser standard for "reasonable means" in civil cases. In Bailey v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co., 613 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, the court held that a witness
who was residing out-of-state at the time of trial was unavailable under rule 804(a)(5). Id. at 1390.
Unlike federal criminal trials, in federal civil cases there is no nation-wide service of process, and
therefore the witness was beyond the court's process and could not be returned to Texas to testify. Id.
178. 609 F.2d at 19.
179. Beyond the court's rather questionable holding, it appears that the defendant might have
raised a valid confrontation clause claim. The failure of the prosecution to even attempt to subpoena
an out-of-state witness, when such a procedure was available, would almost certainly violate the con-
frontation clause in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions on the issue. See infra notes
192-218 and accompanying text.
180. It should be noted that this is not a problem in the federal courts, because there is nation-
widejurisdiction for process in'federal criminal trials. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 804-42.
181. 92 N.M. 275, 587 P.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1978). The court applied that state's version of rule
804(a)(5), which is identical to the federal rule except that it does not require an attempt to depose
the witness. See N.M.R. Evto. 804(a)(5).
182. State v. Waits, 92 N.M. 275, -, 587 P.2d 53, 54(Ct. App. 1978).
183. Id. at____, 587 P.2d at 55.
184. Id. at ,587 P.2d at 54-55. The Uniform Act, which generally provides for compelled
attendance of out-of-state witnesses under certain conditions in criminal'cases, has been enacted in
every state except Alabama. See Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses (U.L.A.) (table of
adopting jurisdictions).
185. 92N.M. at -, 587 P.2d at 55.
186. 277 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1979).
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(5). In Larson, the trial court, faced with the probability that the
declarant would be working out-of-state at the time of the trial,
declined to issue a subpoena detaining the declarant as a material
witness until trial. 87 The trial court instead directed that a
summons be issued to the declarant on the date of the trial. 188
The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, first noting
that the Uniform Act was available as a possible means of
procuring the witness's attendance. 189 The court based its reversal,
however, on the fact that the trial court could have issued a
subpoena which would not have required the declarant to remain in
the state during the period prior to trial, but rather would only have
required him to return to the state on the date of trial. 190 The court
held that, under the circumstances, that was the minimum effort
which should have been made to procure the witness's
attendance. 191
Both Waits and Larson imply that a subpoena alone is not
sufficient to satisfy the "reasonable means" requirement of rule
804(a) (5) when other, more effective methods of procuring the
declarant's attendance are available. Implicit in the rule is a
requirement that the proponent exhaust all reasonable means of
securing the declarant's attendance as a prerequisite to a finding of
unavailability.
C. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND "OTHER REASONABLE
MEANS"
An alleged failure by the prosecution in a criminal case to
exhaust all reasonable means in attempting to procure the
18 7. Stlt v. Larson, 277 N.W .2tl 120. 121 (N.I). 1979) lIl, ('ourt noted that the two-weck
dv(ci1lion of l witness would have undlyt jeolardized his employmtent. Id.
1818. Id.
18). Id. a 122. Although the (ourt recognized the Uniform Acts a possible means of procuring
the witness's attendance, it did not specifically hold that resort to the Act was required for
compliance with rule 804(a)(5) or the confrontation clause. It appears that this issue remains open,
and the applicability of the Waits holding in North Dakota remains unclear.
190. Id. at 123. The court stated:
In the instaint Ctisc, an error retsultetd lrott the view that there were only twso
reasonable alternatives: (I) that the court subpoena Goughnour as a material witness
and detain him 14 days for the trial on the 24th, or (2) that a subpoena be issued on the
24th for service upon Goughnour on the 24th to be present for trial on the 24th.
"'I e tatter is lieco rsc whih th(" court took, appai rnll believing the first to ht
[ d isti'. Attually, at last o11(" oli(r alternative was ;is'iilill. An attempt should
hIl t Itie,, t i ll t I t, v h t wilne'ss was discov'red to be prt'sCnt within the iio rt's
jurisdiction to serve the witness with a subpoena requiring him to be present at trial on
the 24th. Such a subpoena would not have detained the witness within the court's
ijurisdiction 1),'ndinQ the daic' ol'ili trial.
191. IdJ
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attendance of a witness may raise constitutional claims as well as
evidentiary issues. In Barber v. Page, 192 the United States Supreme
Court was presented with a case in which a co-conspirator's prior
testimony was introduced against the defendant. 193 At the time of
trial the witness was incarcerated in a federal prison in Texas, 225
miles from the trial site in Oklahoma. 194 It appeared that the
prosecution made absolutely no effort to obtain the presence of the
declarant at trial after learning that he was not within the state. 195
The Court stated that, although it had previously been
presumed that the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction made
him immune to process, there had been recent developments which
provided methods for securing the attendance of out-of-state
witnesses. 196 The Court noted that the Uniform Act To Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses had been widely adopted, and provided a
means by which authorities from one state could procure the
attendance of witnesses from another state. 197 For witnesses in
prison, as in Barber, the Court further noted that the federal court
power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum and United
State Bureau of Prisons policy provided means of securing the
attendance of federal prisoners. 198
Because the prosecution had made no effort to procure the
declarant's attendance, the Court held that the defendant's sixth
amendment rights had been violated:
In short, a witness is not "unavailable" for purposes of
the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement
unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-
faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. The State made
no such effort here, and, so far as this record reveals, the
sole reason why Woods was not present to testify in
person was because the State did not attempt to seek his
presence. The right of confrontation may not be
dispensed with so lightly. 199
The clear import of the Court's decision in Barber is that the
confrontation clause requires a good-faith effort to produce absent
192. 390 U.S. 719(1968).
193. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720 (1968).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 723.
196. Id. at 723-24.
197. Id. at 723-24 n.4.
198. Id. at 724.
199. Id. at 724-25.
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witnesses before their prior statements will be admissible in a
criminal trial. The Court somewhat restricted this holding,
however, in Mancusi v. Stubbs . 20 0 In Mancusi, the witness was an
American citizen residing in Sweden. 20 1 After discovering this fact,
the prosecution made no further efforts to procure his
attendance. 20 2 At trial the witness's prior testimony was
admitted. 203
The Supreme Court held that there had been no abridgement
of the defendant's sixth amendment rights, distinguishing Barber on
the fact that the prosecution here apparently had no appropriate
method of procuring the declarant's attendance:
The Uniform Act to secure the attendance of
witnesses from without a State, the availability of federal
writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and the established
practice of the United States Bureau of Prisons to honor
state writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, all supported
the Court's conclusion in Barber that the State had not met
its obligations to make a good-faith effort to obtain the
presence of the witness merely by showing that he was
beyond the boundaries of the prosecuting State. There
have been, however, no corresponding developments in
the area of obtaining witnesses between this country and.
foreign nations. Upon discovering that Holm resided in a
foreign nation, the State of Tennessee, so far as this
record shows, was powerless to compel his attendance at
the second trial, either through its own process or through
established procedures depending on the voluntary
assistance of another government .... We therefore hold
that the predicate of unavailability was sufficiently
stronger here than in Barber that a federal habeas court
was not warranted in upsetting the determination of the
state trial court as to Holm's unavailability. 20 4
Justice Marshall, with Justice Douglas joining, filed a
thoughtful dissent. Marshall particularly chastized the majority for
accepting a presumption of unavailability without any showing of
an attempt to procure attendance:
The difficulty with [the majority's] position is that
200. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
201. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 209 (1972).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 212-13 (citation omitted).
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there never has been any factual inquiry resulting in a
determination as to Holm's unavailability. Rather, the
courts have consistently presumed his unavailability from
the bare fact that he lives in Sweden. . . . [I]n Barber v.
Page we squarely rejected any such presumption of
unavailability. In that case, the claim was made that the
court had no power to compel the absent witness to
appear. We held that nevertheless the State was obliged to
make a good-faith effort to secure his appearance, for
" 'the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of
asking and receiving a rebuff.' "205
Marshall concluded that the failure to even attempt to procuie the
witness's attendance violated the defendant's sixth amendment
rights:
I cannot agree, however, that if neither state nor
federal authorities had the power to compel Holm's
appearance, that fact relieved the State of its obligation to
make a good-faith effort to secure his presence. It simply
reduced the likelihood that any effort would succeed. The
State's obligation would hardly be framed in terms of
"good-faith effort" if that effort were required only in
circumstances where success was guaranteed. If, as the
Court contends, it is more difficult to produce at trial a
resident of Sweden than a federal prisoner, that fact might
justify a failure to produce the witness; it cannot justify a
failure even to try. At a minimum, the State could have
notified Mr. Holm that the trial was scheduled, and
invited him to come at his own expense. Beyond that, it
could have offered to pay his expenses. Finally, it could
have sought federal assistance in invoking the cooperation
of Swedish authorities, as a matter of international
comity. 206
It should be noted that Mancusi apparently is not applicable in
federal prosecutions, because federal courts have statutory
authority to compel the attendance of United States nationals or
residents who are outside the country. 20 7 This statute is limited to
205. Id. at 221 (Marshall,.J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 223 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). Marshall's dissent points out that it is arguable that this statute
permits federal courts to assist state courts in compelling attendance at state trials of witnesses out-
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nationals and residents, and does not authorize federal courts to
compel the attendance of aliens. 20
In its most recent opportunity to examine confrontation clause
"unavailability," the Supreme Court further delineated its "good-
faith effort" standard. In Ohio v. Roberts, 20 9  the defendant
challenged admission of a prosecution witness's preliminary
hearing testimony at his trial. 210 At the time of trial it was
established that the witness was not within the state and her parents
did not know where she could be located. 211 The parents indicated
that they had not heard from her since the preceding summer,
when she was living in San Francisco.21 2 The prosecution issued
subpoenas to the witness at her parents' home on five separate
occasions.213
The Court held that, based on these facts, the prosecution had
not breached its duty of"good-faith effort." 2 14 Although the Court
noted that the prosecution might have attempted to telephone a
social worker in San Francisco who had been in contact with the
witness while she was living there, the Court concluded that "the
great improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating
the witness, and would have led to her production at trial,
neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness
required their execution. "215
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, distinguished Barber. In
Barber, the Court noted, "the prosectution knew where the witness
was, procedures existed whereby the witness could be brought to
trial, and the witness was not in a position to frustrate efforts to
secure his production. "216 In the instant case, however, the Court
noted that the witness's whereabouts were unknown, and there was
no assurance that, if found, the witness could be forced to return for
trial.2 1 7
side the United States. 408 U.S. at 222 (Marshall, .. dissenting).
208. SeeWebberv, United States, 395 F.2d 397, 399-400 (10th Cir. 1968).
209. __ U.S. __ 100S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
210. Ohio v. Roberts, _ U.S. _____.100 S. Ct. 2531,2543 (1980).




215. Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan indicated that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden
of establishing the witness's unavailability. Brennan noted that the prosecution's total effort to secure
her presence consisted of five subpoenas sent to her parents' home, three issued after the prosecution
knew she was no longer living there. __ U.S. at __ , 100 S. Ct. at 2546 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Noting that there were other possible leads to follow in attempting to secure her
attendance, and rejecting the majority's determination that any such efforts would have been
fruitless, Brennan concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish that it had used "good-faith
efforts" to secure the witness's attendance. Id. at __ , 100 S. Ct. at 2456-57 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
216. - U.S. at -. , 100S. Ct. at 2544.
217. Id. at__ , 100 S. Ct. at 2544-45.
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The import of the Supreme Court's decisions on this issue is
that the prosecution must use reasonable "good-faith efforts" to
attempt to produce 'the witness at trial. What is reasonable,
however, will vary according to the facts of each particular case. It
appears that if the prosecution knows where the witness is and there
is an available procedure for securing the witness's attendance at
trial, Barber mandates that the prosecution produce the witness. If,
however, the witness's whereabouts are unknown or there is doubt
that a valid procedure exists to secure the witness's attendance, the
prosecution is only required to establish that it used reasonable
good-faith efforts, based on the facts of the particular case, to secure
the witness's attendance. The Court's holding in Roberts, however,
indicates that the prosecution need not exhaust every possible lead
before seeking to have the witness declared unavailable. 218
VIII. UNAVAILABILITY PROCURED BY CONDUCT OF
THE PROPONENT
Rule 804(a) provides that "[a] declarant is not unavailable as a
witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying. "219 The rule implies a two-
fold requirement: that the declarant's unavailability is due to the
"procurement or wrongdoing" of the proponent of his statement,
and that such procurement was for the express purpose of
preventing the witness from presenting live testimony in court.
Federal courts have addressed the rule in a variety of factual
situations.
One issue which has been raised is whether the government's
refusal to grant immunity may amount to "procurement" under
the rule. In United States v. Lang,220 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the defendant's claim
that the prosecution had "procured" the unavailability of a witness
who had asserted a valid fifth amendment privilege by refusing to
grant him immunity. 22' Noting that the power to grant immunity is
discretionary, and that the United States Attorney generally has no
obligation to seek immunity for a witness, 222 the court rejected the
218. Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2544.
219. FFD. R. EviD. 804(a).
220. 589 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1978). Lang has been discussed previously, supra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text.
221. United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1978).
222. Id. at 95-96.
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defendant's contention. 223 The court did indicate, however, that a
different result might have been reached if the prosecution had
actively procured the declarant's unavailability through
harrassment, repeated threats of criminal prosecution, or other
questionable prosecutorial conduct. 22
4
Another issue which has been raised is whether the re-
quirement that the procurement be for the purpose of preventing
the witness from testifying is to be interpreted literally. In United
States v. Seijo, 225 the defendant claimed that the government had
procured the absence of five material witnesses who had been
deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 226 The
prosecutor had in fact gone to extreme lengths in an attempt to
retain the witnesses in the country until trial. 227 The trial court,
however, held that the government had procured the absence of the
witnesses, primarily because the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, which. had deported the witnesses, was also the
governmental department with jurisdiction over the crime which
the defendant had been charged with. 228
The trial court held that the Service's deportation of the
material witnesses, for whatever reason, amounted to "having
done so for the purpose of preventing them from attending or
testifying, ' 229 and stated that "they must be charged with having
intended the consequences of their own acts. "230 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, stating that
there was no reason not to apply "the plain and literal language"
of rule 804(a). 231 Noting that the prosecution had in fact done
everything in its power to detain the witnesses for trial, and, as a
last resort, had secured their depositions to preserve their
testimony, the court found no evidence that the deportation of the
witnesses had been "for the purpose of preventing" the attendance
of the witnesses .232
The court in Seijo was apparently advocating a very literal
223. Id. at 96.
224. Id. see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
225. 595 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1979).
226. United States v. Seiio, 595 F.2d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1979).
227. Id. at 117-18. The court noted that the prosecutor had requested that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service not deport the witnesses until after trial, requested a magistrate to order them
held as material witnesses, and fought their deportation in court. The prosecutor succeeded in
detaining the witnesses in the country for over a month. After a court ruling that the witnesses could
no longer be held, he secured a court order requiring that depositions be taken from the witnesses
before they were deported. Id.
228. Id. at 119. The defendant had been charged with harboring illegal aliens. Id. at 117.
229. Id. at 119.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 120.
232. Id.
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interpretation of the "purpose" requirement. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, apparently
disagrees with the Second Circuit's literal interpretation of the
"purpose" requirement. In United States v. Mathis,2 33 the court
completely overlooked the "purpose" requirement in applying rule
804(a) (5). A witness had been mistakenly released from prison
prior to the defendant's trial. 234 Although the court reached the
correct result, it apparently applied the wrong standard. The court
correctly held that the witness was unavailable, 235 but concluded
that her unavailability had not been procured by the government
because her release had not been due to government negligence. 236
The federal rule, however, does not speak of the proponent's
negligence. The proper analysis under the rule would have been
that the witness's absence had not been procured for the purpose of
preventing her from testifying. The witness was therefore
unavailable under rule 804(a), regardless of whether the
government had been negligent in releasing her.
Although negligence is apparently irrelevant under rule
804(a), the dissent in Mathis points out that there may be a valid
confrontation claim when a witness's absence has been caused by
government negligence.2 37 In Motes v. United States, 238 a prosecution
witness (who was also involved in the crime) was being held in
jail. 239 For some inexplicable reason, the witness was released into
the custody of another prosecution witness only two days prior to
trial.2 40  The witness absconded before testifying, 241  and the
defendants raised confrontation claims when the government
sought to introduce the witness's prior testimony. 242
The United States Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
challenge:
We are of opinion that the admission in evidence of
Taylor's statement or deposition taken at the examining
trial was in violation of the constitutional right of the
233. 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977).
234. United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180, 181, 183 n.2 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1107 (1977). It appears that there were two prisoners with the same name. The government inad-
vertently released the witness in question. Id.
235. Id. at 181-82.
236. Id. Both the majority and the dissent in Mathis discuss the case on the basis of th govrn-
ment's negligence, citing Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), which is discussed infra at
notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
237. 550 F.2d at 182-84 (Widener, J., dissenting).
238. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
239. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 468 (1900).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 470.
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defendants to be confronted with the witnesses against
them. It did not appear that Taylor was absent from the
trial by the suggestion, procurement or act of the accused.
On the contrary, his absence was manifestly due to the
negligence of the officers of the Government.
243
The court concluded:
We are unwilling to hold it to be consistent with the
constitutional requirement that an accused shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to permit the
deposition or statement of an absent witness (taken at an
examining trial) to be read at the final trial when it does
not appear that the witness was absent by the suggestion,
connivance or procurement of the accused, but does
appear that his absence was due to the negligence of the
prosecution. 244
It therefore appears that the confrontation clause mandates
that, in criminal cases, an unavailable witness's prior statements
may not be admitted at trial when the witness's unavailability is the
result of government negligence. Although such a witness may be
considered unavailable under the federal rules, the confrontation
clause will preclude the admission of his prior testimony at trial.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Note is intended to present the reader with the current
state of the law concerning the unavailability requirements under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The law in this area, however, is
constantly in flux; as more courts are presented with opportunities
to discuss the various aspects of the unavailability requirements,
the precise scope of these requirements will become more clearly
defined. Although at present several issues have been left
unresolved, the court decisions to date provide an invaluable
insight into the likely direction those future decisions will take.
DON L. RYSAVY
243. Id. at 471.
244. Id. at 474.
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